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I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is a scenario with which most of us are far too familiar.  You are sitting down 
to dinner or watching TV and the phone rings.  You hope that it is a friend or family 
member calling, but most of the time, there is silence on the other end of the line as 
the telemarketer on the other end waits for the predictive dialing device to notify him 
or her that you have picked up.1  Such devices are responsible for ninety percent of 
                                                                
1Predictive dialer systems use computers to dial many telephone lines at the same time and 
then connect the calls to live operators who either deliver live messages or ask the recipient to 
listen to prerecorded messages.  Their purpose is to weed out busy tones, answering machines, 
and numbers for which there is no answer.  The goal is that a live call will be “waiting for 
telemarketers the second they hang up from the previous call.”  See Kelly Thornton, State 
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all telemarketing calls.2  Before you get the chance to hang up, the obnoxious 
telemarketer launches into a sales pitch.  At the end of the annoying soliloquy, the 
seller says that all they need to do is “verify” some information in order for you to 
complete the purchase.  It is at this point most of us say “no thank you” and hang up.  
Some people say they ignore the call and go back to their daily routine.  
However, by simply answering the phone the would-be consumer has already been 
disturbed.  Indeed, in such an advanced telecommunications society, it is very 
difficult to ignore a ringing phone.  As one commentator has put it, “[t]he telephone 
should not be used as a vehicle for advertising.  Unlike mail, or radio, or television 
commercials, the telephone cannot be ignored at leisure.  It demands sudden and 
undivided attention.”3  The telephone has also been called a “uniquely invasive 
technology” because it essentially “allows solicitors to come ‘into’ the home.”4  
Moreover, consumer groups estimate that telemarketers, with the aid of computer 
technology, make up to twenty-four million calls a day nationally.5  Nonetheless, the 
telemarketing industry raked in a staggering $612 billion in 2000 and, at that rate, it 
seems like the telemarketers are here to stay.6  
There are federal and state laws that exist to help telephone subscribers combat 
the problem, however, these laws are vastly inadequate.  Much of the current 
legislation exempts nonprofit organizations and charities even though commercial 
and noncommercial calls inflict the same disturbance upon residential privacy.7  
Even Congress has acknowledged that residential telephone subscribers that are 
considered any unsolicited telephone call, regardless of the content or the initiator of 
the message, to be a nuisance and an invasion of privacy.8  The good news, however, 
is that states are beginning to pass legislation to further protect residential telephone 
subscribers above and beyond the protections of federal law.9  Additionally, 
consumers are beginning to understand their rights under federal law and are 
exercising them through private actions against the telemarketers.10  However, the 
                                                          
Moves To Clamp Down on Telemarketing Hang-Ups; Beyond Being a Nuisance, Phantom 
Calls Frighten Many, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIBUNE, Aug. 13, 2001, at A1.   
2Arthur Winston, DM and Commercial Speech, DM NEWS, Feb. 22, 1993, at 18.   
3Joseph R. Cox, Telemarketing, The First Amendment, and Privacy:  Expanding 
Telemarketing Regulations Without Violating the Constitution, 17 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & 
POL’Y 403, 403-04 (1996).   
4Id. at 420. 
5Thornton, supra note 1, at A1. 
6CNN Today:  Several States Considering Legislation That Would Restrict Telemarketing 
(CNN television broadcast, Jan. 12, 2001) (transcript available in LEXIS, News, Transcript # 
01011211V13). 
7Moser v. FCC, 811 F. Supp. 541, 545 (D. Or. 1992).   
8137 CONG. REC. H11307 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991).   
95.6 Million People in 13 States say “Don’t Telemarket to Me,” COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, 
September 5, 2001, available at 2001 WL 5053940 [hereinafter COMMUNICATIONS DAILY]. 
10In Ohio alone, several individuals have exercised their right to sue telemarketers.  Some 
have even sued multiple times against multiple telemarketers and have collected significant 
damages.  See Irvine v. Akron Beacon Journal, No. 20450, 20524, 2002 WL 24324 (Ohio Ct. 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss3/6
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laws that regulate telemarketing do not apply to all organizations, and these 
loopholes must be closed in order to protect consumers from the seemingly constant 
barrage of telemarketing calls.   
The first section of this Note examines the relevant federal laws that are already 
in place to assist the frustrated public in avoiding these unwanted calls.  The second 
section discusses the constitutionality of such legislation and why it is considered to 
improperly limit the freedom of commercial speech.  The third section focuses upon 
what the states have done to supplement the federal law and increase regulation as 
well as the proposed changes in the federal law itself.  The fourth section analyzes 
the ineffectiveness of the federal and state regulations in place and specifically 
argues against the allowance of exceptions in these laws, including those for 
nonprofit organizations, charities, and companies with which the consumer has an 
established business relationship.   
II.  THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991 
A.  Legislative History 
In 1991, the public’s frustration at unwanted telephone solicitations became so 
adamant that Congress was forced to respond.  It passed the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act (hereinafter TCPA) which regulates the telemarketing industry so as 
to protect consumers from unwanted telephone solicitations.11  According to one of 
the Act’s framers, Edward J. Markey of Massachusetts, the TCPA was an attempt by 
Congress to balance an individual’s right to privacy in the home with the advances 
made in the telemarketing industry.12  Among other things, the law regulates 
automated telephone equipment, fax machines, and live telemarketing.13  
Specifically, the TCPA effectively prohibits telemarketers from using devices that 
employ artificial or pre-recorded voices without the prior consent of the recipient.14  
It also creates private rights of action as a way of empowering consumers to hold 
telemarketers responsible for repeated calls over the recipient’s objections.15  
According to the Act, if any person receives more than one unsolicited phone call in 
violation of the Act, that person can pursue a private right of action against the entity 
                                                          
App. 9th Dist. Jan. 9, 2002) (finding newspaper liable for violations of Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act (hereinafter TCPA)); Adamo v. AT&T, No. 79002, 2001 WL 1382757 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2001) (affirming judgment for plaintiff against defendant AT&T for 
violations of TCPA); Charvat v. Dispatch Consumer Serv., 769 N.E.2d 829 (Ohio 2002) 
(holding that plaintiff effectively terminated his “established business relationship” with 
newspaper by requesting to be placed on a “do-not call” list); Charvat v. Colorado Prime, No. 
97APG09-1277, 1998 WL 634922 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1998) (reducing plaintiff’s 
judgment because original telemarketing call does not count as a violation of TCPA); Charvat 
v. ATW, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 805 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (holding that no private right of action 
accrues under TCPA unless telemarketer calls more than once in a twelve-month period 
without consumer’s consent).   
11Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C.A. § 227 (2002). 
12See 137 CONG. REC. E793-02 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1991) (statement of Rep. Markey).   
13See 47 U.S.C. § 227.   
14§ 227(b)(1)(A). 
15§ 227(b)(3), (c)(5).   
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in violation.16  Such an action must be brought in an “appropriate” state court and 
can be filed to enjoin such a violation, or to “recover actual monetary loss from such 
a violation, or to receive up to $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is 
greater[.]”17  In addition, the TCPA also allows a state to bring a civil action against 
an entity if the state believes that the entity has engaged in a pattern or practice in 
violation of the TCPA.18  
More importantly, the TCPA directs the Federal Communications Commission 
(hereinafter FCC) to use its regulatory power to formulate additional regulations to 
meet the requirements of the Act.19  For instance, Congress invited the FCC to 
consider a host of methods and procedures for regulating unsolicited sales calls, 
including “the use of electronic databases, telephone network technologies, special 
directory markings, [and] industry-based or company-specific ‘do not call’ systems. 
…”.
20
  Congress also gave the FCC the option of developing a national “do not call” 
database, which would entail the compilation of a national “list of telephone numbers 
of residential subscribers who object to receiving telephone solicitations, and to 
make that compiled list and parts thereof available for purchase.”21   
Since the enactment of the TCPA, the FCC has responded to Congress’s 
suggestions and has established its own set of regulations.22  However, the FCC 
chose not to establish the national database, and left the creation and maintenance of 
the “do-not-call” lists up to the telemarketers themselves.23  Also, the FCC 
regulations state that a telemarketer must clearly state the name of the business or 
individual initiating the call as well as the telephone number or address of the 
business or individual.24  Furthermore, the regulations prohibit any telemarketer from 
calling between the hours of 9 p.m. and 8 a.m. local time at the called party’s 
location.25  Combined with the TCPA’s private right of action, any consumer can 
potentially use a violation of these regulations to initiate a lawsuit against a 
                                                                
16§ 227(b)(3). 
17§ 227(c)(5)(B).   
18§ 227(f). 
19§ 227(b)(2).   
20§ 227(c)(1)(A).   
21§ 227(c)(3).   
22See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (2001). 
2347 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e)(2)(i) (“Persons or entities making telephone solicitations must 
have a written policy, available upon demand, for maintaining a do-not-call list.”); § 
64.1200(e)(2)(iii) (“If a person or entity making a telephone solicitation…receives a request 
from a residential telephone subscriber not to receive calls from that person or entity, the 
person or entity must record the request and place the subscriber’s name and telephone 
number on the do-not-call list at the time the request is made.”); § 64.1200(e)(2)(vi) (“A 
person or entity making telephone solicitations must maintain a record of a caller’s request not 
to receive future telephone solicitations.  A do not call request must be honored for 10 years 
from the time the request is made.”).    
2447 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d). 
2547 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e)(1).   
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telemarketer.26  However, a consumer is not likely to succeed if the telemarketing 
entity can prove that it has instituted measures to effectively prevent telephone 
solicitations in violation of the TCPA and FCC regulations because the TCPA 
expressly makes evidence of such efforts an affirmative defense.27  
The TCPA also permits the FCC to exempt from these regulations those calls 
made by noncommercial entities, including nonprofit organizations and charities, as 
well as those entities with which the recipient already has an established business 
relationship.28  According to one commentator, “Representative Markey claimed that 
such an exception was ‘common sense,’ and that consumers do not mind certain 
classes and categories of calls, presumably charitable, political, research, and other 
noncommercial calls.”29  However, the TCPA grants the FCC authority to reconsider 
these exceptions.30  To date, the FCC has allowed charities, nonprofit organizations, 
and political groups to be exempt from the regulations.  Thus, many state laws, 
following the FCC’s lead, allow these exemptions to exist as well.31   
B.  Private Right of Action 
1.  Federal Jurisdiction vs. State Jurisdiction 
Although the TCPA is federal law, it expressly gives states jurisdiction to hear 
any private right of action consumers may bring against a telemarketing entity.32  
Senator Ernest Hollings, the bill’s sponsor, defended such an express grant of 
jurisdiction.33  Hollings believed that if consumers were to bring private actions 
against violators of the TCPA, state jurisdiction would make it as easy as possible on 
such consumers.34  Specifically, Senator Hollings envisioned that consumers would 
                                                                
26See cases cited supra note 10.  Many individuals who have filed suit have been 
successful by simply alleging that the telemarketers did not send a written copy of their do-
not-call policy or that the telemarketers failed to provide the party called with a full name 
and/or address of the telemarketing entity. 
2747 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5)(C) (2002) (“It shall be an affirmative defense in any action 
brought under this paragraph that the defendant has established and implemented, with due 
care, reasonable practices and procedures to effectively prevent telephone solicitations in 
violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection.”).   
28§ 227(a)(3).  See infra text accompanying note 187 (for a definition of “established 
business relationship”). 
29Howard E. Berkenblit, Can Those Telemarketing Machines Keep Calling Me?—The 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 After Moser v. FCC, 36 B.C. L. REV. 85, 99 
(1994). 
3047 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1)(D) (2002) (“[T]he Commission shall initiate a rulemaking 
proceeding…[and] the proceeding shall—consider whether there is a need for additional 
Commission authority to further restrict telephone solicitations, including those calls 
exempted under subsection (a)(3) of this section…”.). 
31See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text. 
3247 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), (c)(5).    
33See infra note 34 and accompanying text. 
34See Chair King Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 513 (S.D. Tex. 1997) 
(“Senator Hollings indicated the intent of the bill was for consumers to easily be able to 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2003
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bring pro se actions in state small claims courts because he did not want the 
consumer burdened with having to litigate in common pleas courts and pay 
substantial attorneys’ fees.35  Senator Hollings wanted to ensure that there was an 
appropriate enforcement mechanism in place because, at the time the bill was 
proposed, the FCC went on record that it was not persuaded that any kind of 
legislation regulating telemarketing was necessary to address consumer complaints.36  
Therefore, knowing the FCC’s lack of desire for enforcement, Senator Hollings 
wanted to be sure that citizen enforcement would be effective and that states would 
be able to facilitate such a citizen enforcement scheme.37  
To be sure, the fact that a state court can have original jurisdiction in cases 
arising under federal law is nothing new.38  By sharing jurisdiction with the national 
government, the states ensure that the scales on the balance of power are not unfairly 
tipped toward the federal government.  Still, the U.S. Constitution provides that 
federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land” and is controlling on every court 
subject to it.39  Therefore, states not only have the authority to hear cases arising 
under federal law, but may be obligated as well.  Moreover, because the TCPA 
appears to grant exclusive jurisdiction to the states to hear private actions, the 
jurisdictional issues may become more complex.     
2.  Can the States Opt-Out? 
Because the TCPA is a federal law that grants the states express jurisdiction to 
hear cases arising from violations of the law, it creates controversy regarding any 
discretion the states may have in interpreting the law or even choosing to hear the 
cases at all.  In his article, State Courts and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 
of 1991:  Must States Opt-In?  Can States Opt-Out?, Robert Biggerstaff addresses 
the jurisdictional questions raised by the text of the TCPA as well as the states’ 
obligations to facilitate Senator Hollings’ vision of a citizen enforcement scheme.40  
                                                          
enforce the bill by recovering damages.  He emphasized states should facilitate this by 
providing fora in which consumers could appear without an attorney.”). 
35137 CONG. REC. S16204-01 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings), 
(“Small claims court or a similar court would allow the consumer to appear before the court 
without an attorney.  …However, it would defeat the purposes of the bill if the attorneys’ costs 
to consumers of bringing an action were greater than the potential damages.”).   
36See Biggerstaff, infra note 40, at n.66 (quoting FCC Chairman Alfred C. Sikes) (“It is 
not clear, however, that sweeping Federal legislation is required….[T]his may be a situation 
where continued regulatory scrutiny and monitoring, subject to Congressional review and 
oversight, is preferable to passage of legislation.” (citations omitted)). 
37See 137 CONG. REC. S16204-01, supra note 35. 
38See The Federalist, No. 82, at 132 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Gaylord Bourne ed. 
1947) (“When…we consider the State governments and the national governments, as they 
truly are,…as parts of ONE WHOLE, the inference seems to be conclusive, that the State courts 
would have a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of the Union, where it 
was not expressly prohibited.”). 
39U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
40Robert R. Biggerstaff, State Courts and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 
1991:  Must States Opt-In?  Can States Opt-Out?  33 CONN. L. REV. 407 (2001).  
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss3/6
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Biggerstaff argues that the TCPA is “no different from any other federal law in 
regard to a state court’s ability and obligation to hear such cases,” and therefore, the 
states do not have to formulate separate legislation that conforms to the TCPA in 
order to hear such actions.41  However, in International Science & Technology 
Institute v. Inacom Communications, Inc.,42 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit suggested that states are allowed to “opt-out” and close their courts to actions 
under the TCPA.43  In response, Biggerstaff argues that the International Science 
rationale is in error because a state does not have the authority to “arbitrarily close its 
courts to TCPA actions while allowing similar state claims, any more than a state 
could close its courts to FELA, RICO, or other federal causes of action.”44 
If a state were allowed to “opt-out” of the TCPA’s citizen-enforced, regulatory 
scheme, that state would be able to deny the enforcement of a federal law in its own 
court system, thereby affecting the “very foundation of federal supremacy.”45  A 
more plausible interpretation of the TCPA’s ambiguous language46 is that Congress 
intended not only that states could hear cases brought under the TCPA without 
additional state legislation, but also that states do not have the authority, absent an 
explicit statement from Congress, to “opt-out” and refuse to hear such cases.47 
III.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TCPA 
For the most part, the TCPA regulates commercial speech.  Combined with the 
language of the Act, as well as the FCC regulations, the TCPA dictates how and 
when a telemarketer may make an unsolicited call to a residential telephone 
subscriber.48  As a consequence, the TCPA has undergone substantial constitutional 
                                                                
41Id. at 408. 
42Int’l Sci. & Technical Inst. v. Inacom Communications, Inc., 106 F.3d 1146, 1156 (4th 
Cir. 1997).  Plaintiff argued that a private right of action pursuant to the TCPA could only be 
brought if there was state legislation that provided for a similar private action.  Id.  The 
plaintiff’s reasoning was that if a state had not passed “opting-in” legislation, then any citizen 
of that state would have to bring the case in Federal Court or else there would be an Equal 
Protection Clause violation.  Id.  The court rejected this reasoning by holding simply that there 
was no requirement for states to “opt-in” in order to hear claims brought under the TCPA.  Id.    
43Biggerstaff, supra note 40, at 408 (Biggerstaff also defines the terms “opt-in” and “opt-
out.”  The former means an “action by a state legislature that singles out the TCPA; for 
example a state law which provides: ‘Civil suits, under 47 U.S.C. § 227 are hereby authorized 
to be heard in the courts of this State.’”  The latter “refers to a state legislature enacting a law 
that carves out a specific exception for the TCPA; for example, a state law that provides:  
‘Civil suits, under 47 U.S.C. § 227 may not be heard in the courts of this State.’”).  
44Id. (citations omitted). 
45Id. at 426. 
4647 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), (c)(5) (2002).    
47Biggerstaff, supra note 40, at 427-28.  Biggerstaff concludes that “it is unquestioned that 
states cannot obstruct the operation of federal laws….Congress has implemented citizen suits 
as a primary enforcement mechanism in many statutes and has never provided that a state may 
close its courts to such enforcement.”  Id.  
48See generally 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 and 47 U.S.C. § 227. 
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scrutiny since its enactment.49  Many scholars and judges have rendered their own 
interpretations of the law, but the controversy still exists.50  One reason why this area 
of federal law is still quite unsettled is because most actions brought under the TCPA 
are brought in state small claims courts, as Senator Hollings envisioned.51  As one 
commentator put it, “state small claims courts (over which Holmses, Hands, and 
Cardozos rarely preside) are poor forums for producing uniform interpretations of 
federal law,” and thus “essentially insures that few TCPA cases will result in 
reasoned appellate decisions.”52   
A.  Regulation of Commercial Speech 
When Congress enacted the TCPA, the goal was to be able to regulate the 
telemarketing industry by balancing the residential telephone subscriber’s privacy 
rights against the telemarketers’ free speech rights.53  Originally, commercial speech 
was not afforded First Amendment protection,54 but gradually the Supreme Court 
began to recognize some protection for this type of speech.55  The Court reasoned 
that “the free flow of commercial information” was critical in order for consumers to 
be able to make intelligent and well-informed purchasing decisions.56  However, the 
Supreme Court has also recognized that commercial speech, while important, should 
not be afforded the same kind of protection as other forms of speech.57  This 
difference in treatment was formulated because commercial speech was regarded as 
more durable than other forms of speech, and it was easier to verify.58 
Thereafter, in 1980, the Supreme Court developed a four-part test in order to 
examine acceptable restraints on commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas & 
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.59  First, in order to come within the 
                                                                
49See Deborah L. Hamilton, Note, The First Amendment Status of Commercial Speech:  
Why the FCC Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 Are 
Unconstitutional, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2352 (1996).  
50See id. 
51See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
52Robert R. Biggerstaff and Hilary B. Miller, Application of the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act to Intrastate Telemarketing Calls and Faxes, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 667, 669 
(2000).    
53See Lisa Boardman Burnett and Consuelo Lauda Kertz, Telemarketing Tug-of-War:  
Balancing Telephone Information Technology and the First Amendment with Consumer 
Protection and Privacy, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1029, 1060 (1992).   
54See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).   
55See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).    
56Id. at 736-65.   
57Id. at 770-71, n.24. 
58Id.  See also Boardman & Kertz, supra note 53, at 1042. 
59Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).  
(allowing electrical utility to bring suit in New York State court to challenge the 
constitutionality of a regulation of the New York Public Service Commission that completely 
banned promotional advertising by the utility). 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss3/6
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purview of the First Amendment, the speech must concern lawful activity and not be 
misleading.60  Second, the government’s interest in promoting the restriction against 
the commercial speech must be substantial.61  If the answer to both of these questions 
is yes, a court must then determine “whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted, and [finally], whether it is not more extensive than is 
necessary to serve that interest.”62  According to the Central Hudson test, the TCPA 
is constitutional as long as the government’s interest in the right to privacy of a 
residential telephone subscriber is substantial, and the TCPA itself “directly 
advances the governmental interest” and is “not more extensive than is necessary to 
serve that interest.”63 
The Supreme Court has also formulated a different constitutional test to examine 
acceptable restraints on commercial speech.  This method of analysis is the “time, 
place, or manner” test, and was defined and illustrated by the Supreme Court in 
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.64  In that case, commercial publishers brought 
a civil rights action, requesting declaratory and injunctive relief against the 
enforcement of a Cincinnati ordinance, which prohibited distribution of "commercial 
handbills" on public property, and was used as a basis of ordering the removal of 
newsracks that the publishers used to generate business.65  The publishers argued that 
the ordinance distinguished the newsracks based on the content of the materials 
inside because the ordinance did not ban newsracks that sold regular newspapers as 
opposed to the free “magazines” offered by the plaintiffs.66 
The Court rejected Cincinnati’s argument that the ordinance was only regulating 
the time, place, and manner of the distribution of the plaintiffs’ magazines, which is 
allowable provided that the government is adequately justified “without reference to 
the content of the regulated speech.”67  The Court held that although the city has the 
right to regulate the time, place, and manner of commercial speech, it could not do so 
if the magazines were banned due to the “content of the publication resting inside 
that newsrack.”68  The Court reasoned that the ban was “content based,” and 
therefore unconstitutional.69  Ultimately, the “time, place, and manner” test is 
essentially identical to the “commercial speech” test except for the non-content based 
                                                                
60Id. 
61Id. 
62Id. 
63Id. 
64City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
65Id. at 412-13. 
66Id. at 419 (The plaintiffs distributed free publications regarding adult educational, 
recreational, and social activities as well as many advertisements, including, but not limited to, 
real estate listings.  Basically, the ordinance sought to prevent these free advertisements from 
becoming sidewalk litter, as they often did.). 
67Id. at 428 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989), quoting 
Clark v. Comty. For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). 
68Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 429. 
69Id. 
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requirement.  The remainder of the “time, place, and manner” test is intermediate 
scrutiny, which means that government restrictions must be narrowly tailored to 
serve a significant government interest.70  Basically, there must be a “reasonable fit” 
between the means employed and the ends sought, and there must be “ample 
alternative channels for communication of the information.”71  
Moser v. FCC was one of the first cases that specifically challenged the 
constitutionality of the TCPA.72  In that case, the National Association of 
Telecomputer Operators (hereafter NATO) brought an action against the FCC.73  
Because the TCPA banned the use of automated devices,74 NATO argued that the 
law created a content-based restriction not narrowly tailored to further a substantial 
government interest, and therefore violating the First Amendment and the “time, 
place, and manner” test illustrated by Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.75  NATO 
also claimed that the TCPA violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.76  In analyzing the Act, the Ninth Circuit classified the TCPA as a 
“content-neutral, time, place and manner restriction” because nothing in the TCPA 
required the FCC to differentiate between commercial and noncommercial speech 
insofar as its prohibition on automated devices was concerned.77  Ultimately, the 
court held that the TCPA could constitutionally ban all automated telemarketing calls 
without having to ban all other telemarketing calls.78  This “underinclusiveness” 
approach did not render the TCPA unconstitutional because underinclusiveness only 
constitutes a violation when “a regulation represents an attempt to give one side of a 
debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people.”79   
B.  Is a Complete Ban Unconstitutional? 
The Moser court did not specifically say that a complete ban on all telemarketing 
calls would be unconstitutional because the issue did not have to be addressed for 
adjudication.80  However, the court seemingly left the door open for such a ban, just 
as the TCPA had done by allowing the FCC to consider whether further restrictions 
on telemarketing would be necessary.81  To date, there is little authority on the 
constitutionality of a complete telemarketing ban, but the First Amendment arguably 
                                                                
70Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
71Cox, supra note 3, at 408 (citations omitted). 
72Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995). 
73Id. at 973. 
7447 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A).  
75Moser, 46 F.3d at 973. 
76Id. 
77Id.  
78Id. at 975.   
79Id. at 974 (citing First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785-86 (1978)).   
80See Moser, 46 F.3d 970. 
8147 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1)(D).   
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ensures that such a ban would likely be held unconstitutional.82  Both commercial 
speech and speech made by tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations involve a number of 
First Amendment implications;83 a complete ban would have to withstand the First 
Amendment’s free speech guarantees.  Furthermore, a complete ban, although a 
seemingly good solution to the most frustrated of residential telephone subscribers, is 
not supported in most laws regulating telemarketing.84  Indeed, almost every piece of 
state and federal legislation, including the TCPA, allows for the exemption of certain 
types of calls, most notably nonprofit organizations, charities, and political groups.85  
However, Joseph Cox has argued that under the present law, including the 
Central Hudson and Discovery Network tests, a complete ban on all telemarketing 
calls “without prior knowledge of consent” would be constitutional.86  Under this 
reasoning, telemarketers could only call if the recipient had previously consented to 
being called.  This, in turn, would be spinning the “presumption back on its feet,” 
meaning “it presumes people do not want to be solicited absent a request … instead 
of presuming they want to be called.”87  In acknowledging the widespread exemption 
of charities and nonprofits, Cox retreats and argues that any law which seeks to 
regulate telemarketing should leave these exemptions in place, even if the 
government gathered information which revealed that most people do not want to be 
bothered by charitable solicitations either.88     
Why are charities and nonprofits excluded in the first place?  Historically, 
charitable speech has been afforded more protection than commercial speech.89  
According to one court, “charitable solicitation involves a variety of speech interests 
protected by the First Amendment; therefore, it is not purely ‘commercial speech,’ 
and it is subject to traditional ‘strict scrutiny’ under the First Amendment.”90  Unlike 
the commercial speech tests of Central Hudson and Discovery Network, charitable 
and nonprofit speech is judged by a higher constitutional standard than pure 
commercial speech.91  Furthermore, under this “strict scrutiny” test, “[a] restriction 
subject to strict scrutiny must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state 
interest.”92   
                                                                
82See Hamilton, supra note 49. 
83Id. 
84See infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
85Id. 
86Cox, supra note 3, at 421. 
87Id. at 422. 
88Id. at 423.   
89Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748.   
90Am. Ass’n of State Troopers, Inc. v. Preate, 825 F. Supp. 1228, 1232 (M.D. Pa. 1993) 
(citing Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 787-88 (1988)). 
91Id. 
92State Troopers, Inc., 825 F. Supp. at 1232 (citing Int’l Soc. For Krishna Consciousness, 
Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992)). 
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However, it would seem as though a complete ban on telemarketing calls both 
commercial and noncommercial alike would be achieving a “compelling state 
interest” if the vast majority of citizens of a particular jurisdiction wanted such a ban.  
Conceivably, the courts could balance the privacy interests of residential telephone 
subscribers with the speech interests of telemarketers and decide that the privacy 
interests were greater.  Indeed, “[a]ll of the courts have consistently held that the 
privacy right of the home is a significant interest.”93   
Furthermore, whether the deciding court uses the “time, place, and manner” test, 
the Central Hudson four-part test, or strict scrutiny, a complete telemarketing ban 
could still be found constitutional.  Assuming strict scrutiny is used, which is the 
most difficult test to satisfy of the three, the government would have to show that the 
regulation was “narrowly tailored” and that the state interest was “compelling.”94  
Arguably, a complete ban might not be seen as narrowly tailored if there were a less 
restrictive means of achieving the same objective.  However, the government could 
then show that the only reasonable means of ensuring a residential telephone 
subscriber’s privacy is indeed a complete ban.  Such an argument could also be 
bolstered by a finding of overwhelming support in the particular state or jurisdiction 
for a complete ban.  In addition, the ban itself would not have to be total.  As Cox 
notes, a constitutional ban would only have to apply to those consumers who did not 
wish to be called.95  Therefore, it appears that a complete ban on all telemarketing 
calls, both commercial as well as nonprofit, could survive constitutional scrutiny.  As 
Cox argues, “there are likely no constitutional limitations to banning telemarketing 
calls to all people except those who have expressed a desire to receive them.  
Congress or the states should feel secure in their authority to take additional steps to 
protect their citizens from a disliked, if not loathed, practice.”96   
IV.  FURTHER REGULATION:  THE DO-NOT-CALL APPROACH 
When the TCPA was enacted, Congress authorized the FCC to establish its own 
regulations regarding telephone solicitations.97  In enacting these regulations,98 the 
FCC decided not to establish a national do-not-call database.99  Instead, the FCC 
chose to leave the do-not-call list implementation to the telemarketing entities.100  In 
response, the states have begun to pass legislation creating their own do-not-call 
                                                                
93Cox, supra note 3, at 420. 
94State Troopers, Inc., 825 F. Supp. at 1232. 
95Cox, supra note 3, at 421-22 (“Therefore, the government should…fashion restrictions 
so they do not amount to a blanket ban but…only a ban on calls made without prior 
knowledge of consent.  Essentially, this takes regulations one step further than ‘do-not-call’ 
lists: the homeowner does not have to endure even a single call from each telemarketer.”). 
96Id. at 423.   
9747 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2) (2002) (“The Commission shall prescribe regulations to 
implement the requirements of this subsection.”). 
98See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (2002). 
99See supra  note 23 and accompanying text. 
100Id.   
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databases101, and the idea of a national do-not-call database has again been 
proposed.102  However, there are many real and potential problems involved in 
establishing such databases, and those that have already been established continue to 
face criticism for lack of effectiveness as well as poor cost efficiency.103        
A.  State Regulation  
As of September 2001, fourteen different states had enacted “no call” laws, 
which allow residential telephone subscribers to register their names and/or numbers 
with telemarketers as those not to be called.104  The largest lists belong to New York 
and Missouri, which have amassed 1.8 million and 1.5 million names respectively.105  
Almost all of these laws prescribe heavy penalties ranging from $2,000 per violation 
to $25,000, and the telemarketers must pay an annual fee in order to consult the state 
lists, which are usually published quarterly.106  According to Gryphon Networks, a 
company that specializes in providing no-call list administrative services, twenty-six 
additional states are considering some kind of no-call legislation, further proving that 
consumers have had enough of pesky telemarketers and are influencing their own 
state legislatures to address the problem.107  In effect, the flood of recent state 
legislation is “a signal of how unpopular telemarketing has become among 
Americans.”108   
While many consumers are delighted at the flood of state action against 
telemarketers, the resulting legislation is not immune from criticism.  According to 
one commentator, “a myriad of exemptions and lax enforcement in many states 
threaten their ultimate effectiveness.”109  Moreover, “the statutes are layered with 
exemptions for charities, political groups, and companies that already have a 
                                                                
101See COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, supra note 9. 
102Robert Hager, Hotline to Stop Telemarketers, (Jan. 22, 2002), available at 
http://www.msnbc.com/news/692357.asp?pne=ms. 
103See Michael E. Shannon, Combating Unsolicited Sales Calls:  The “Do-Not-Call” 
Approach to Solving the Telemarketing Problem, 27 J. LEGIS 381 (2001). 
104See COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, supra note 9. 
105Id.  (The other states include Conn., 750,000 names; Tenn., 636,000; Ga., 224,500; Fla., 
143,400; Ky., 123,000; Ind., 115,000; Or., 43,000; Idaho, 38,700; Ark., 16,000; Alaska, 5,300; 
Wis., N/A. Colorado also has 230,000 maintained by Bighorn Center, a nonprofit association, 
which will be added once the law is enacted in 2002.  The total number of names on statewide 
do-not-call lists is upwards of 5.6 million.).    
106Id. 
107Id. 
108Craig Savoye, States Spare Residents from Telemarketers, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR, Dec. 22, 2000, at 2, available at 2000 WL 4433175.   
109Shannon, supra note 103, at 411 (citing Jerry Markon, Take Me Off Your List!  (Pretty 
Please?) STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Dec. 27, 2000, at 1D, also available at 2000 
WL 7003353.)  Shannon also notes, “No-call laws…offer consumers the ability to opt out of 
most unwanted sales calls, provided that they are not burdened by exemptions for too many 
types of solicitors.  While some statutes are fairly effective, and some are merely adequate, 
still others have enough loopholes to render them practically unenforceable.”  Id. 
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relationship with the consumer.”110  For example, there are twenty-two different 
exemptions under Kentucky’s no-call law, making it “one of the weakest in the 
nation.”111  Furthermore, some states have refused to fine telemarketers even though 
their laws have been in place for several years.112 
In addition to the criticism that these laws do not go far enough in their 
regulations, any state legislation that regulates the telemarketing industry must also 
pass constitutional muster.  One author has identified two different constitutional 
issues associated with state telemarketing legislation including federal preemption of 
state law and “dormant” Commerce Clause analysis.113  In his article, Michael 
Shannon notes the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit in Van Bergen v. Minnesota, which states that “federal law can preempt state 
law without an express statement by Congress when the federal statute implies an 
intention to preempt state law or when state law directly conflicts with federal 
law.”114  However, Shannon also notes the TCPA language that states, “nothing in 
this section or in the regulations prescribed under this section shall preempt any State 
law that imposes more restrictive intrastate requirements or regulations. …”115  He 
then concludes that it is unclear whether state telemarketing legislation applies to 
interstate calls as well, and that “although there is no express statement in the TCPA 
that indicates Congress wanted to preempt state laws that affect interstate 
telemarketing, a court might conclude that the statute implied that intent.”116 
In his commerce clause analysis, Shannon recognizes that “the Supreme Court 
has ruled that the Commerce Clause operates on a negative basis to prevent state 
laws that unduly burden interstate commerce.”117  Under this traditional “dormant” 
Commerce Clause analysis, state laws are examined to determine whether they 
substantially interfere with interstate commerce.118  The resulting implication 
regarding the TCPA is that if a state law were to regulate telemarketing, how would 
such a law apply to out-of-state telemarketers?  In other words, would such a law be 
regulating the interstate “commerce” of telecommunications, and therefore be in 
violation of the Commerce Clause itself?   
                                                                
110Markon, supra note 109, at 1D. 
111Shannon, supra note 103, at 412. 
112Id.  (“No Alaska telemarketer has been fined since passage of no-call legislation in 
1996.  Arkansas has yet to fine anyone either—probably because the state allows telephone 
solicitors eight to ten free violations.  Even states that do fine telemarketers do not…do so to 
the full extent the laws allow.” (citations omitted)). 
113Id. at 413. 
114Id. at 414 (citing Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1548 (8th Cir. 1995)). 
115Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(1)). 
116Shannon, supra note 103, at 414. 
117Id. at 415 (citing General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997) (citing 
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 (1980))). 
118General Motors Corp., 519 U.S. at 287. 
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One particular case that may shed some light on the dormant Commerce Clause 
issue is American Library Ass’n v. Pataki.119  In that case, the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York examined a New York law regarding 
the transmission of harmful material over the Internet, specifically to children.120  
The court held the law to be in violation of the Commerce Clause because the Act, 
“by its terms…applies to any communication, intrastate or interstate, that fits within 
the prohibition and over which New York has the capacity to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction.”121  Therefore, the law was “per se violative of the Commerce 
Clause.”122 
If the Pataki Court’s rationale is applied to any state law that attempts to regulate 
interstate telemarketing activity, then the state laws may be invalidated.  To date, 
such a challenge has yet to occur,123 but appears imminent considering what is at 
stake for the telemarketing industry.124 
Regardless, most state laws seeking to regulate telemarketing are too weak to be 
effective.125  More importantly, the inconsistency in state regulations would wreak 
havoc on the telemarketers who would be constantly striving to comply with the 
regulations and apply them state-by-state.  Furthermore, the state regulations might 
be a usurpation of federal authority.  The only logical solution appears to be a federal 
remedy, which by its very nature, would be a uniform application of the law.  The 
question, however, is what that federal remedy should entail. 
B.  The Federal Proposal-A National List 
One solution offered by numerous commentators, scholars, and legislators is the 
creation of a national do-not-call list, whereby one large registry would be formed 
for people who did not wish to receive telemarketing calls.126  The creation of such a 
list is specifically authorized by the TCPA,127 and until recently,128 the FCC and the 
                                                                
119American Library Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
120Id. at 163. 
121Id. at 169-70. 
122Id. at 183-84.  But see Shannon, supra note 103, at n.288 (citing James E. Gaylord, 
Note, State Regulatory Jurisdiction and the Internet:  Letting the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Lie, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1095, 1127 (1999) (arguing that eventually the courts may let the states 
slide and allow them to regulate out-of-state activity specifically directed to any in-state 
resident).  
123Shannon, supra note 103, at 417 (“The outcome…would likely decide the fate of no-
call laws in general: if the states were not permitted to address the problem of out-of-state 
telemarketers calling state residents, only Congress or the FCC could enact effective do-not-
call legislation—something for which neither body has shown much inclination to date.”). 
124Telemarketing companies report that every dollar spent on calls brings back eight times 
as much in sales, totaling more than $600 billion annually.  See Hager, supra note 102. 
125See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text. 
126See Hager, supra note 102. 
12747 U.S.C. § 227(c)(3). 
128See Hager, supra note 102. 
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Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter FTC) have disregarded the option.129  
However, in 2002, the FTC revisited the idea of a national do-not-call registry and 
announced a formal proposal.130  Under the plan, the FTC would supplement the 
current company-specific do-not-call provision with an additional provision that will 
enable a consumer to stop calls from all companies within the FTC’s jurisdiction by 
registering with a central do-not-call list maintained by the FTC.131  However, there 
is one large catch in the proposal: the plan itself is limited by the FTC’s own 
jurisdiction, which means that any national do-not-call database would not apply to 
banks, telephone companies, airlines, insurance companies, credit unions, charities, 
political campaigns, and political fundraisers.132  Not surprisingly, such organizations 
are among those who make the lion’s share of all telemarketing calls.133   
However, certain telemarketers, including those selling home repairs, vacations, 
and financial investments would most likely not be exempt, and under the new rules, 
telemarketers who make calls in violation of the national list would face fines of up 
to $11,000 per violation.134  Furthermore, the FTC may also be able to limit calls 
made on behalf of charitable organizations as mandated by the Patriot Act, which 
was passed in response to the events of September 11, 2001.135      
Not surprisingly, such a national registry is likely to meet strong opposition from 
the telemarketing industry.  Robert Wientzen, the president and chief executive of 
                                                                
129The Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter FTC) also has jurisdiction regarding the 
regulation of telemarketing practices.  In 1994, Congress passed the Telemarketing and 
Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6101-08 (West 1998).  
Pursuant to the authority granted it by the Act, the FTC passed the Telemarketing Sales Rule 
(hereinafter TSR) in 1995, codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, 16 C.F.R. § 310 
(2002).  The TSR closely mirrors the FCC’s regulations found in 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, 
especially regarding the maintenance of company-specific do-not-call lists, time restrictions, 
and the disclosure of information.  See 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)-(c).  The national do-not-call 
proposal is one element of the FTC’s proposal to modify the TSR.  See FTC File No. R411001 
(Jan. 22, 2002), FTC Proposes National “Do-Not-Call” Registry, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/01/donotcall.htm.     
130See Hager, supra note 102. 
131See FTC File No. R411001 (Jan. 22, 2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/01/ 
donotcall.htm.  The proposal also calls for permitting a consumer who registers with the 
central “list” to receive telemarketing sales calls from an individual company or charitable 
organization to which the consumer has provided his or her express verifiable authorization to 
make telemarketing calls to the consumer (emphasis added).  In addition, the proposal also 
prohibits the practice of blocking telemarketer name and/or number information for caller 
identification purposes as well as clarifying that the use of predictive dialers resulting in “dead 
air” violates the Rule.  Id. 
132Kevin G. DeMarrais, Curbs on Marketing Calls Sought by FTC, THE RECORD, Jan. 23, 
2002, at A01.  
133Id. 
134Id. 
135Id.  The Patriot Act does not change the exemption of charitable organizations from 
FTC jurisdiction, but it does “enable the FTC to act against for-profit companies that engage 
in fraudulent, deceptive, or abusive practices when they solicit contributions on behalf of 
charities or purported charities.”  Id.     
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The Direct Marketing Association,136 has asserted that “[t]he telemarketing sector is 
an essential part of … [the] communications and marketing industry.…”137  The 
telemarketing industry also employs more than six million people, and the industry is 
ready to vigorously defend itself and attack any proposal which “overstep[s] its 
boundaries by spending taxpayer dollars to limit communication that is protected by 
the First Amendment to American consumers who benefit from and shop via 
telephone solicitations….”138  The national list may also drive some telemarketers 
out of the country in order to avoid the new regulations.139 
A national do-not-call list, if put into effect, also faces severe logistical problems.  
In 1992, the FCC issued a report along with its regulations prescribed by the 
TCPA.140  The report acknowledged that a national list could cost between $20 
million and $80 million, to implement, and maintenance of the list could cost federal 
taxpayers up to another $20 million annually.141  But cost is only the beginning of the 
problem.  The national list would put small businesses at a disadvantage, and 
ultimately, the additional costs to large and small businesses alike would be passed 
on to consumers.142  There are also overriding privacy concerns.  For instance, if a 
consumer is to join the national list, what information must he or she give, and how 
will that information be protected?  What if a consumer, whose number is unlisted 
but continues to receive telemarketing calls, wants his or her name on the list?  How 
can that individual be sure the information he/she gives remains confidential?143  If 
and when a national list is formed, consumers will likely want suitable answers to 
such questions.   
Another problem faced by a national do-not-call database is obsolescence.144  The 
FCC’s report noted that one-fifth of all telephone numbers change each year, and 
therefore the national database “would be continuously obsolete and would require 
constant updates in order to remain accurate.”145  Despite these numerous problems, 
                                                                
136The Direct Marketing Association (hereinafter DMA) is a New York-based trade 
organization that represents some 5,000 companies nationwide.  For twenty-five years, the 
association has maintained its “Telephone Preference Service,” which is essentially a national, 
privately funded do-not-call list whereby member organizations are prohibited from calling 
residential telephone subscribers as a condition of membership.  See DeMarrais, supra note 
132, at A01. 
137Id. 
138Id. (quoting DMA president Robert Wientzen).   
139David Ho, Rules Aim to Curb Telemarketers, AP ONLINE, Jan. 22, 2002, available at 
2002 WL 10034093. 
140In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the TCPA of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R. 8752, 8758-61 
(1992). 
141Id. at 8758 (citing comments of AT&T). 
142Shannon, supra note 103, at 396. 
143For more on the potential privacy implications regarding a national do-not-call 
database, see id. 
144Id. at 401. 
145In re Rules & Regulations, 7 F.C.C.R. at 8759. 
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some commentators favor the national do-not-call list,146 and the popularity of the 
idea has yet to fade, as is evidenced by the FTC’s latest proposal.  However, 
problems persist because a national list would not include many of the most 
notorious telemarketers, including phone companies and charities.147  The FTC 
simply does not have jurisdiction to limit such telemarketers,148 and ultimately a 
national list would not significantly stop those annoying calls which always seem to 
come at the most inappropriate times.  In the end, a national list would only serve to 
frustrate consumers who continue to get these unwanted calls even though their 
number is on the national database. 
V.  THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS 
The ineffectiveness of the TCPA as implemented by FCC regulations is likely 
one of the most significant reasons why states have initiated their own telemarketing 
regulations.149  States have recognized the weakness of the federal laws and 
regulations and have responded by getting tougher on telemarketing.  However, the 
state laws themselves are not perfect.150  Ironically, many of the state laws also 
possess the same particular weaknesses of the federal laws, the most significant 
being the exemptions of nonprofits and other organizations.151  The elimination of 
these weaknesses should be the goal of any legislation which regulates telemarketing 
in order to relieve consumers of unwanted solicitation calls. 
A.  Private Organizations-A Voice for Frustrated Consumers 
In response to the apparent weaknesses in the present state and federal laws, 
some consumers have created organizations dedicated solely to the elimination of 
what they call the “tele-nuisance industry.”152  One such organization is called 
Private Citizen, and promotes itself as “America’s first, largest, and most effective 
organization of its type to cut your junk calls and junk mail.”153  Robert Bulmash, a 
frustrated consumer whom telemarketers seemingly pushed too far, founded the 
organization in 1988, which sends its members do-not-call requests to over 1,500 
                                                                
146Shannon, supra note 103, at 402 (“Given the choice between a do-not-call system with 
this level of effectiveness and a company specific system that requires consumers to notify 
every company not to call them individually, it would seem that Americans prefer the former 
approach.”). 
147See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.  
148Id. 
149See Thornton, supra note 1, at A1 (“Federal law makes companies keep ‘do-not-call’ 
lists….But most consumer activists say the law has loopholes.  As a result, some states have 
laws to create ‘do-not-call’ lists and to ban or limit…[other telemarketing practices].”). 
150See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text. 
151Id. 
152Markon, supra note 109, at 1D (quoting Robert Bulmash, president of Private Citizen 
Inc., a consumer advocacy group dedicated to battling the telemarketing industry). 
153Private Citizen, Inc., Home Page at http://www.privatecitizen.com (last visited Aug. 31, 
2002). 
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telemarketing firms nationally.154  For twenty dollars a year, Private Citizen members 
authorize the organization to send telemarketers a “contract,” whereby any 
telemarketer who calls the member without prior authorization agrees to pay that 
particular member $100.155  Although some lawyers argue that such a “contract” may 
not withstand strict legal scrutiny, many telemarketers who receive do-not-call 
requests honor these requests anyway.156  
Another consumer organization advocating the eradication of nuisance calls is 
Junkbusters, which maintains a website dedicated to informing consumers of how to 
get telemarketers to stop calling.157  As part of its informational service, Junkbusters 
publishes a “script” which consumers should use when telemarketers call.158  By 
making this script available, consumers will be able to properly inform telemarketers 
of their desire not to be called again as well as gather information to use as evidence 
in a potential lawsuit.159  The Junkbusters website also provides consumers with links 
to other telemarketing websites as well as an extensive guide on how telemarketing 
works.160 
Junkbusters also assists consumers in contacting the Direct Marketing 
Association (hereinafter DMA).161  The DMA, a New York-based trade organization 
serving the direct marketing field, is perhaps the closest thing to self-regulation by 
the telemarketing industry.162  Members of the DMA include 4,800 different 
businesses who promise not to telemarket DMA members.  Some have praised the 
DMA by acknowledging that it is in the telemarketing industry’s “best interest to 
avoid calling those consumers who are bothered by telemarketing calls.”163  In other 
words, telemarketing will be more efficient in general if telemarketers refrain from 
calling those consumers who do not wish to be called and will therefore probably not 
buy anyway.    
Nevertheless, organizations like Private Citizen, Junkbusters, and DMA are 
limited in their effectiveness.  Many consumers are unaware of their services, which 
                                                                
154See id. 
155Michael Miller, When the “Junker” Calls, This Man Is Ready for Revenge, WALL ST. 
J., June 24, 1991, at A1. 
156Id. 
157Junkbusters, Inc., Home Page at http://www.junkbusters.com (last visited Aug. 31, 
2002) [hereinafter Junkbusters]. 
158Id.  
159Id.  Junkbusters does not guarantee a consumer success if he or she takes legal action 
against the telemarketer.  However, the organization does inform the consumer about what the 
law is, what constitutes a violation of the law, and whether such a violation is one for which 
the TCPA allows a private right of action.  Id.  
160Id. 
161See Junkbusters, supra note 157. 
162Shannon, supra note 103, at 386.  The DMA created the Telephone Preference Service, 
whereby consumers can call and request to have their numbers put on its do-not-call list.  This 
list is then sent to and used by approximately 4800 member businesses nationwide.  Id. 
163Id. 
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are limited.  Consumers continue to receive unwanted telemarketing calls, and more 
importantly, private consumer groups and services cannot stop the barrage of 
unwanted calls from telemarketers who are exempt from the federal regulations, 
including nonprofits, charities, and political organizations.164 
B.  Numerous Exceptions 
In defining the term “telephone solicitation,” the TCPA specifically excludes 
calls made by tax-exempt nonprofit organizations as well as those organizations with 
which the caller has an established business relationship.165  Over the eleven-year 
history of the TCPA, this exclusionary language has been interpreted to apply to 
most nonprofit organizations, charities, and political organizations/campaigns.166  
However, many of these organizations are often the biggest telemarketing 
offenders.167   
The irony is that the TCPA does not necessarily mandate exemptions for such 
tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations.168  In fact, the solution already exists within the 
TCPA because it authorizes the FCC to reconsider such exemptions regarding 
nonprofits and related organizations.169  Therefore, if the Act is applied to its full 
potential, charities, tax-exempt nonprofit organizations, and even political groups 
and organizations would also be subject to the FCC regulations under the TCPA.   
In addition, the TCPA also exempts organizations with which the consumer has 
an established business relationship.170  At first glance, this exception may seem 
logical, but such an exception is simply another loophole that telemarketers may 
attempt to use to bypass punishment under the TCPA.171  For instance, if a consumer 
requests placement on a telephone solicitor’s do-not-call list for one service but 
continues to buy a separate service from the soliciting entity, is he or she protected 
by the TCPA?  As will be discussed later, the Charvat v. Dispatch Consumer 
Services172 case may hold an answer favorable to consumers.  Nevertheless, the 
“established business relationship” exception must be reevaluated and/or eliminated 
on a national scale in order to protect consumers from the potential abuse such an 
exception may allow. 
                                                                
164Id. at 388. 
16547 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3). 
166Keala Murdock, Telemarketers Get Excommunicated, COLORADO SPRINGS BUSINESS 
JOURNAL, May 18, 2001, at 4, available at 2001 WL 11294014. 
167DeMarrais, supra note 132, at A01. 
16847 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1)(D). 
169Id. 
17047 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3). 
171See Charvat v. Dispatch Consumer Serv., 769 N.E.2d 829 (Ohio 2002). 
172Id. 
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1.  Charities, Politics, and Non Profits — Who Is Really Getting the Money? 
As the TCPA dictates, tax-exempt nonprofit organizations are exempt from the 
regulations imposed by it as well as FCC regulations.173  Representative Markey, one 
of the bill’s sponsors, noted that these exemptions were “common sense,” and that 
consumers “do not mind” certain classes and categories of calls, presumably 
charitable, political, research, and other noncommercial calls.174  Also, charities and 
nonprofit organizations enjoy more constitutional protection because their speech is 
noncommercial.175  However, even under the “strict scrutiny” test, a state or federal 
law involving the regulation of these ordinarily-exempted entities could survive 
constitutional scrutiny as long as it was “narrowly tailored” and there was a 
“compelling government interest.”176   
Furthermore, whether charitable or commercial, many consumers loathe 
telemarketing calls altogether; and consumer advocates argue that state and federal 
laws riddled with exemptions for charities and nonprofits do not help in cutting back 
unwanted calls.177  Even the telemarketing industry has acknowledged that the 
numerous exemptions in federal and state laws produce a watered-down effect.178  
According to Matt Mattingly, director of government affairs for the American 
Teleservices Association, which represents the telemarketing industry, the laws are 
often bogged down with exceptions, and that is one reason why there is so much 
dissatisfaction with the current federal rules.179   
Another justification for stripping charities and nonprofits of their exempted 
status under the TCPA and FCC regulations is that on average, only twenty-four 
percent of all donations made to charities will actually be received by the charities.180  
The rest usually goes to the telemarketing firm that was hired to make the solicitation 
calls.181  Sometimes, the charities only receive as little as five or ten percent of the 
gross donated amount.182  Such a practice is often a necessary evil for small or 
unpopular charities that employ solicitors to build a donor base and gain name 
                                                                
17347 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3). 
174See Berkenblit, supra note 29, at 99. 
175Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).   
176Am. Ass’n of State Troopers, Inc. v. Preate, 825 F. Supp. 1228, 1232 (M.D. Pa. 1993). 
177Jon Van, Phone Solicitor Restrictions Face Hard Battle Before FTC; Observers Say 
Eventual Result May Be Watered-Down Rules, THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Jan. 27, 2002, at 
4E.   
178Need CITE 
179Id.  (Mattingly stated, “First, they exempt politicians who are calling for your 
vote…Then there are charities, and then businesses with which you have an existing 
relationship.  Pretty soon, there are enough exemptions that it’s only certain people who can’t 
call you, and the excluded group gets smaller and smaller.”). 
180Antitelemarketer.com, at http://www.antitelemarketer.com/index2k18x6.htm (last 
visited Aug. 31, 2002). 
181Id. 
182Developments in the Law — Nonprofit Corporations, IV. Charitable Solicitation, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1634. 
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recognition.183  However, this type of contingent-fee solicitation may actually be 
doing more harm than good.  According to one source, “excessive contingent-fee 
solicitation increases fundraising costs for all charities, reduces actual charitable 
output, and tends over time to promote the interests of large ‘establishment’ charities 
over those of newer organizations.  Most seriously, contingent-fee fundraising 
dissipates the substantial goodwill that charities have traditionally enjoyed with the 
donating public.”184   
When viewed in light of the events of September 11, 2001, the effects of 
contingent-fee telemarketing seems even more alarming.  In response to the terrorist 
attacks, Americans gave over $1.4 billion to the survivors.185  However, three months 
after the attacks, New York’s Attorney General was already investigating two 
charities, the New York Firefighters Foundation and the New York Police 
Scholarship Fund.186  Both charities were operating out of Florida, and investigators 
said that both charities had “nothing to do with the city’s fire and police 
departments.”187  Consequently, it seems that charities, nonprofits, and related 
organizations as well as the telemarketing firms they employ are just as fallible and 
vulnerable to fraud as any other entity that uses telemarketing.188  For that reason, all 
tax-exempt nonprofit organizations like charities and political groups should be 
subject to the same standards as other telemarketers under the TCPA and FCC 
regulations.  
2.  The Established Business Relationship Loophole 
One of the additional exemptions afforded by the TCPA and FCC regulations is 
where the party being called has an “established business relationship”189 with the 
organization or business doing the telemarketing.190  At first glance, such an 
exemption may seem logical.  After all, many businesses may want to contact their 
                                                                
183Id. 
184Id.  See also NBC News: Nightly News, Profile: Some Charities Getting Very Few of 
the Dollars We Pledge [hereinafter NBC News] (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 20, 2001) 
(transcript available at 2001 WL 24025448). 
185See NBC News supra note 184. 
186Id. 
187Id.  (“Yet last year, according to state records, [both] charities used telemarketers to 
raise over $1 million, but got less than ten percent of the donations.”  The head of one of the 
charities said he was not taking advantage of anyone, but he refused to tell NBC News what he 
did with his ten percent.). 
188It is estimated that Americans lose $40 billion a year to fraudulent telemarketers and the 
FBI estimates that there are 14,000 illegal sales operations bilking consumers in the United 
States every day.  Antitelemarketer.com, supra note 180. 
18947 C.F.R. § 64.1200 defines “established business relationship” as “a prior or existing 
relationship formed by a voluntary two-way communication between a person or entity and a 
residential subscriber…on the basis of an inquiry, application, purchase or 
transaction…regarding products or services offered by such person or entity, which 
relationship has not been previously terminated by either party.”  Id. 
190§ 227(a)(3) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(3). 
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existing customers and the customers themselves may want to hear from the 
business, especially if the business, for example, is having a special sale or offer only 
for existing customers.191  However, the exemption can also impose a severe burden 
to a consumer who unwittingly purchases a product or service from a business.   For 
example, if the business uses the consumer’s purchase as a basis to solicit the 
consumer to buy other products or services that the business produces or provides, 
the consumer has no recourse because he or she has established a “business 
relationship” with the company or business, and the soliciting entity may make all 
the sales calls it wants.  
However, a recent decision by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Charvat v. Dispatch 
Consumer Services can be seen as nothing less than an overwhelming victory for 
consumers on this particular issue. 192  In Charvat, the plaintiff subscribed to the 
Sunday edition of the Columbus Dispatch newspaper.193  Although the plaintiff did 
not wish to receive the newspaper every day, the newspaper continued to place 
solicitation calls, encouraging Charvat to subscribe on a daily basis.194  Charvat 
therefore asked the newspaper to put his number on its do-not-call list, but the 
newspaper did not heed his request and continued to place sales calls to him.195  
Thereafter, Charvat instituted an action to recover damages pursuant to the 
newspaper’s alleged violations of the TCPA.196  In affirming the dismissal of 
Charvat’s claim, the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County, held 
that the plain language of the TCPA and the FCC’s definition of “established 
business relationship” exempted the newspaper from federal regulations.197  
Therefore, Charvat would have no recourse and would have to continue accepting 
the solicitation calls from the Columbus Dispatch.198  
In reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that 
“an existing customer can effectively terminate an ‘established business relationship’ 
for purposes of the TCPA by requesting to be placed on a ‘do not call’ list.”199  
Moreover, this will not force consumers to terminate all aspects of the business 
relationship.  In Charvat’s case, according to the court’s decision, he will not have to 
cancel his Sunday subscription, thus giving him both the protection of the TCPA 
                                                                
191Jerry Markon, “Don’t Call” Laws Raise False Hope for Peace, Quiet, WALL S. J., Dec. 
22, 2000, at B1 (quoting Linda Goldstein, a New York lawyer who represents telemarketers.). 
192Charvat, 769 N.E.2d 829. 
193Id. at 830. 
194Id. 
195Id. 
196Id. 
197Charvat, 769 N.E.2d at 830. 
198Id.  But see In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act, 10 F.C.C.R. 12,391, n.32 (“We emphasize that a request not to be 
called would also sever an established business relationship.  Thus, such a request would 
obligate a person or entity in an established business relationship with the resident to comply 
with the rules on telephone solicitiation.” (citations omitted)).  
199Id. at syllabus.   
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from telemarketing calls by the newspaper, as well as the benefits of his Sunday 
subscription.200  In other words, the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision gives 
consumers the best of both worlds; they can continue to purchase a good or service 
from a business entity, yet also be rid of telemarketing calls from that entity.  As the 
Charvat Court held, “[i]t is not consistent with the [TCPA] that a person who 
subscribes to the daily newspaper in a one-newspaper town must be prisoner to 
telephone pitches for a publisher’s panoply of products.”201 
Situations like that presented in Charvat present a legitimate reason as to why the 
“established business relationship” should be reevaluated and/or eliminated by the 
FCC.  For example, what if the soliciting entity is much larger than a newspaper?  
Are subsidiaries or parent companies part of the “business” for purposes of 
establishing a business relationship?  The issue has yet to be litigated, but if the term 
“business” is interpreted expansively, consumers’ do-not-call requests ought to be 
treated the same way as in the Charvat decision.  Situations like Charvat are the 
precise reason why the loophole needs to be closed.  A consumer should never be 
“forced” to receive telephone solicitations as a mere consequence of him or her 
buying goods and services, and the Charvat decision is definitely a step in the right 
direction.    
VI.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Telemarketing is a booming industry, and is likely to become even larger in the 
future.  However, the industry is unique in that it can come directly into the 
consumer’s home in order to solicit goods, services, and donations.  Moreover, the 
ring of the telephone demands immediate attention, and cannot be ignored, thus 
making the practice of telemarketing all the more invasive.  Yet the public has made 
it known that big business should never outweigh personal privacy.  Consumers’ 
antipathy toward the telemarketing industry is evidenced in state and federal laws, 
judicial opinions, articles, essays, and also in the popular culture and media.202  The 
                                                                
200Id. at 834 (“The FCC does not require that the subscriber stop purchasing from a 
company associated with the telemarketer.  It requires only that the consumer seek to cease the 
‘voluntary two-way communication’ that is the definitional heart of the ‘established business 
relationship.’”).     
201Id. 
202Consider comedian Jerry Seinfeld’s view of telemarketing, as exhibited in an episode of 
his NBC sitcom: 
UNIDENTIFIED ACTRESS:  Well, I… 
(SEINFELD):  I’m sorry.  Excuse me one second. 
(PHONE RINGING) Hello. 
(TELEMARKETER): Hi, would you be interested in switching over to TMI long-distance 
service? 
SEINFELD:  Oh, gee, I can’t talk right now.  Why don’t you give me your home number 
and I’ll call later? 
(LAUGHTER) 
(TELEMARKETER):  Well, I’m sorry.  We’re not allowed to do that. 
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public’s loathing of telemarketing is perhaps the most amplified on the Internet, 
where the consumer’s collective voice is heard through consumer advocacy websites. 
Congress took a big step in enacting the TCPA, which remains to be consumers’ 
most effective weapon in the fight against the telemarketing industry.  However, the 
federal law is replete with loopholes and exemptions, which has prompted many 
states to draft tougher laws regulating telemarketing.  However, doubt remains as to 
the constitutional validity of the state statutes regarding federal preemption.  
Moreover, many of the state statutes possess the same exemptions and loopholes as 
the TCPA, making overall telemarketing regulation fairly ineffective. 
In response to growing consumer complaints, the FTC proposed the creation of a 
national do-not-call registry whereby telemarketing regulation would be uniform on 
a national scale.  Pursuant to the proposal, consumers would conceivably add their 
own telephone numbers to the list, and the list would then be sold to telemarketers 
across the nation.  However, this proposal faces severe logistical and substantive 
concerns.  The implementation of a national registry would be costly, hard to 
maintain, and raise serious consumer privacy issues.   
In addition, because the FTC has limited jurisdiction, the national registry would 
not apply to many of the entities that are the most fervent telemarketers, including 
phone companies and charities, thereby rendering the national list modestly effective 
at best.  A national registry would be more effective if the FCC sponsored the 
proposal, because the FCC has much broader jurisdiction than the FTC.  However, 
the FCC has not yet expressed any inclination of implementing such a list.  
Therefore, it would be wise for telemarketing opponents to lobby the FCC for such a 
proposal, because a “do-not-call” list program sponsored by the FCC would be much 
more effective than the same proposal sponsored by the FTC.     
Another possible solution is to reverse the rationale of the national do-not-call list 
and make the list one that includes those rare consumers who want to be called. The 
list could then be distributed to telemarketers, who would only call those consumers 
who consented to being called.  Such a proposal would make telemarketing more 
efficient and telemarketers would know they were calling willing potential 
customers.  If such a list were proposed, perhaps the true status of telemarketing in 
the minds of consumers would be indicated by how many people signed up to accept 
telemarketing calls. 
Currently, federal and state anti-telemarketing laws are relatively weak and need 
to be strengthened by the reevaluation and/or elimination of exemptions for tax-
exempt nonprofit organizations, including charities.  While there is strong public 
policy in favor of an exemption for charities, an alarmingly vast amount of all money 
donated will go straight into the hands of telemarketers, and not the charities.  
Furthermore, the contingent-fee telemarketing on behalf of charities is exceedingly 
susceptible to fraud.  As an alternative, why not allow the consumers the choice of 
not only to what charity they will donate but whether or not to donate at all?  By 
                                                          
SEINFELD:  I guess you don’t want people calling you at home. 
(TELEMARKETER):  No. 
SEINFELD:  Well now you know how I feel. 
CNN Today:  Several States Considering Legislation That Would Restrict Telemarketing 
(CNN Television Broadcast, Jan. 12, 2001) (transcript available at LEXIS, News, Transcript # 
01011211V13). 
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nudging consumers to take a little initiative, money donated would go directly to the 
charity of choice, and the telemarketers would be cut out of the loop completely. 
As far as the “established business relationship” loophole is concerned, cases like 
Charvat are a step in the right direction for the rights of consumers.  If the Charvat 
rationale becomes national policy, consumers will have the benefit of being able to 
purchase goods and services from whomever they want without having to worry 
about another telemarketer invading their homes.  As the Charvat Court so prudently 
noted, “[t]he purpose of the [TCPA] is to reduce the nuisance aspect of 
telemarketing.  Maintaining some commercial tie to a business should not leave 
consumers at the mercy of unbridled telemarketing efforts.”203   
A complete ban on telemarketing, although arguably constitutional, would likely 
meet strong resistance.  A $600 billion per year industry employing over 6 million 
people is vital to a thriving economy and is likely to put up a substantial fight.  
Moreover, a small minority of the population may actually enjoy telemarketing calls.  
Nevertheless, the larger majority should have the benefit of more stringent 
regulations on the telemarketing industry as a whole.  Many consumers find 
telemarketing of all types equally frustrating, and they are entitled to laws that 
actually protect them.  Federal and state laws that are replete with loopholes and 
exemptions fix only part of the problem.  Congress, along with the FCC and state 
governments, must act to purge the anti-telemarketing laws of loopholes that make 
the laws weak and ineffective.  Once these exemptions are eliminated, the laws will 
be more effective, efficient, and useful to the consumer. 
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